Advances in belief dynamics: Introduction by F. Liu & O. Roy
Synthese (2010) 173:123–126
Knowledge, Rationality & Action 1–4
DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9710-x
Advances in belief dynamics: Introduction
F. Liu · O. Roy
Received: 11 December 2009 / Accepted: 11 December 2009 / Published online: 3 January 2010
© The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Contemporary models of beliefs and information have taken the interactive and the
dynamic path. They have outgrown the traditional epistemological paradigm of a
single agent facing a static environment by first looking at multi-agent scenarios
and their crucial “higher-order” component—i.e. belief about beliefs or information
about information—and, second, by drawing attention to changes incurred to these
attitudes in dynamic situations. Synthese: Knowledge, Rationality & Action has proved
an important platform for the diffusion of contemporary research along these two lines,
witness, e.g. Ågotnes et al. (2009) and van Ditmarsch et al. (2009), a trend that we
proudly follow in the present special issue.
The themes of interaction and information dynamics have, of course, not been
pursued in parallel. As is often the case in logic (Gabbay et al. 2003), their product
generated a rich, but rather complex array of new problems. Table 1 gives a bird’s
eye view of the resulting landscape, which will help us situate the contributions in the
present issue.
The top-left cell (a) is the classical locus of investigation in epistemology: the
individual knower and her static environment (Steup 2001). It is also the origin of
most logical investigations into the concepts of knowledge and beliefs, i.e. with the
pioneering work of (Hintikka 1962). Many fundamental issues are still being studied
in this area, e.g. the notion of awareness (e.g., Fagin et al. 1988; Ågotnes and Alechina
2007), or the “logical omniscience” problem (Vardi 1986; Duc 1995). Epistemic logic,
however, has grown multi-dimensionally.
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Table 1 Two axes for the analysis of beliefs
On moving to the right in the table one gradually departs from the individual par-
adigm towards an understanding of beliefs and information in social contexts. The
first step in this direction is to acknowledge that in such contexts, individual beliefs
and information bear not only on the state of a given environment, but also on what
others believe and know about this environment, about what they believe and know
about what the others believe and know, and so on. Multi-agent epistemic logic, see
e.g. (Fagin et al. 1995) and (Meyer and van der Hoek 1995), has proved very useful
in shedding light on this distinguishing feature of beliefs in interaction.
One can go further, acknowledging the social or interactive aspects of beliefs and
information, cell (c), and try to understand how such attitudes can be meaningfully
attributed, not to individuals but to groups or collective agents. One way of doing so
is by investigating the conditions under which a group attitude can be derived from
those of the group’s members. Preference aggregation, belief merging, and judgement
aggregation are studies of that kind, in which Daniele Porello’s contribution to this
issue also falls. He explores the logical relationship between preference aggregation
and judgement aggregation, an issue that has been much discussed in recent years. To
compare Arrow’s theorem (Arrow 1963) with the impossibility result for judgement
aggregation, List and Pettit (2002, 2004) used the notion of ranking judgments. This
allowed them to embed the framework of preference into the framework of judge-
ments. Daniele Porello studies the opposite direction, showing that the impossibility
of aggregation of ranking judgments can be derived from an Arrovian preference
aggregation framework.
John Cantwell’s contribution brings us back to the single agent case, but moves one
step along the vertical axis of Table 1, cell (d), where updates in the agent’s beliefs and
information come into the picture. This is the traditional area of decision theory, e.g
(Savage 1954; Jeffrey 1965), and recently of conditional doxastic logic (Baltag and
Smets 2006), both of which try to understand how an agent’s probabilistic or graded
beliefs should be updated in the face of new information. John Cantwell’s contribution
takes a stance in the debate between evidential (Jeffrey 1965) and causal (Joyce 1999)
decision theorists, debunking a purported counterexample (Egan 2007) to the latter. In
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the course of doing so, he advocates a fundamental change in the way we understand
decision theory, arguing that we should see it as a theory of rational decision making
rather than a theory of rational acts, and as one that recommends different policies of
belief change, “Bayesian conditioning” vs “imaging,” in different circumstances.
Sven Ove Hansson’s contribution also keeps to the single agent case, but from the
point of view of belief revision theory (Alchourron et al. 1985; Rott 2001), i.e. cell
(g). Here one considers how to update one’s beliefs in the face of new information that
typically contradicts one’s previous beliefs. In this issue, against the backdrop of a
vast literature on iterated revision, Sven Ove Hansson looks in particular at a realistic
phenomenon of multiple belief contraction, i.e. simultaneously retracting a number
of previously held beliefs. He provides an axiomatization for both iterated and finite
multiple contraction, that is, contraction by a finite set of sentences. In addition, he
shows how the finite multiple contraction can be reduced to a single-sentence contrac-
tion, and how iterated contraction can be reduced to an order-sensitive, single-step,
single-sentence contraction.
Natasha Alechina and Brian Logan brings this general view to the multi-agent case,
cell (h), for agents whose memory, time and computational resources are bounded.
They take an approach developed by (Ågotnes et al. 2007) to model the process of
deriving consequences from a new item of information together with agents’ previous
beliefs, and apply it to cope with the problem of belief ascription, i.e. assigning beliefs
to another agent. They show that, in the general case, correct belief ascription cannot
be guarantied for resource-bounded agents, even in the limit, but that one can circum-
vent this problem by assigning “reasoning strategies”, or preference on formulas, to
the agents.
Last but not least, it is worth drawing attention on the three cells of Table 1, which
represent three areas of research that are not covered in this issue: (e), (f) and (i).
The first two are actually a very actives areas: the interactive epistemology, expanding
the resources of Bayesian decision theory to cope with the multi-agent case (Aumann
1999; Brandenburger 2007), and the Bayesian aggregation literature (Risse 2003). The
last one, by contrast, has received much less investigation. What should the dynam-
ics of group attitudes look like? Are the contemporary tools for analyzing individual
and interactive information dynamics sufficient, maybe in combination with resources
from the theory of judgment and Bayesian aggregation, to explore this terra incognita?
These are questions that can only be answered by further investigation. It is our hope,
however, that the contributions in this issue will pave the way.
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